Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty
Research and Publications

Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Department of

1-2019

SDN Testbed for Evaluation of Large Exo-Atmospheric EMP
Attacks
Diogo Oliveira
Nasir Ghani
Majeed M. Hayat
Jorge Crichigno
Elias Bou-Harb

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/electric_fac
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty Research and
Publications/College of Engineering
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; but the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The
published version may be accessed by following the link in th citation below.

IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 57, No. 1 (January 2019): 88-97. DOI. This article is © Institute of
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in
e-Publications@Marquette. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).

SDN Testbed for Evaluation of Large ExoAtmospheric EMP Attacks
Diogo Oliveira

School of Information, Florida State University

Nasir Ghani

Department of Electrical Engineering, University of South Florida

Majeed Hayat

Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Marquette University.

Jorge Crichigno

Department of Integrated Information Technology, College of Engineering and Computing, University
of South Carolina

Elias Bou-Harb

Computer Science Department at Florida Atlantic University

Abstract:
Large-scale nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks and natural disasters can cause extensive network
failures across wide geographic regions. Although operational networks are designed to handle most single or
dual faults, recent efforts have also focused on more capable multi-failure disaster recovery schemes.
Concurrently, advances in software-defined networking (SDN) technologies have delivered highly-adaptable
frameworks for implementing new and improved service provisioning and recovery paradigms in real-world
settings. Hence this study leverages these new innovations to develop a robust disaster recovery (counter-EMP)
framework for large backbone networks. Detailed findings from an experimental testbed study are also
presented.
Network recovery from catastrophic disaster events is a major concern. In particular there is renewed concern
about large-scale electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks caused by nuclear detonations in space by hostile statebased actors.

Introduction
Network recovery from catastrophic disaster events is a major concern. In particular there is renewed concern
about large-scale electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks caused by nuclear detonations in space by hostile statebased actors. These exo-atmospheric attacks can occur at varying height of bursts (HoB), ranging from 50–100
miles (low-altitude) to 500 miles (high-altitude) and will emit large amounts of gamma radiation. In turn, these
emissions will interact with the Earth's atmosphere and magnetic fields to release electrons [1]. Specifically,
three types of EMP pulses will be generated across a broad range, called E1, E2 and E3 (see Fig. 1). The initial E1
component is a high-frequency short-duration pulse (10 MHz-1 GHz, ns-ms) with very high electric fields, over
10 kV/m. Unshielded electronics are particularly vulnerable to this effect. Meanwhile, the E2 component is a
lower frequency longer-lasting pulse generated by secondary gamma scattering (100 kHz-10 MHz, ms-sec),
However, this component is similar to lightning strikes, and hence existing shielding methods can suffice. Finally,
the E3 component has much longer durations and lower frequencies (10–100 Hz, seconds-min-utes) and can
severely damage electrical grids [2]. Note that E3 pulses can also be generated by geomagnetic storms from
solar flares, and smaller non-nuclear EMP (NN-EMP) devices can also emit intense emissions across the E1-E3
spectrum (albeit with much smaller footprints).

Figure 1. Effects of exo-atmospheric (space-based) nuclear EMP strike.
Overall, nuclear EMP attacks can cause near-instantaneous failure of unshielded electronics depending on
warhead yield and epicenter location. These events are commonly called stressors and can damage critical
infrastructures across a wide region, for example, telecommunications, electricity, oil, gas, water,
transportation, aviation, agriculture, and so on. Systematic interdependencies between many of these

infrastructures can trigger delayed cascades, further exacerbating fallouts [3]. Now several live space-based EMP
tests have been conducted in the past, with empirical measurements showing notable damage at extended
distances, for example, Starfish Prime, Kingfish, and K-3 (Fig. 1). These tests yielded vital empirical data and also
helped uncover deficiencies with earlier EMP models (which largely underestimated the E1 component). Hence
more accurate formulations were developed based on the pioneering work of theoretical physicist Dr. Conrad
Longmire at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, USA. Based on these models, a potential 1.5 megaton
detonation over the central United States today (akin to the Starfish Prime test) will damage over 350 large
transformers and cut power to almost 40 percent of the population [2]. Moreover, it will likely take years to
rebuild and reinstall damaged power grids. Given these sobering facts, in 2011 the United States Congress
established a commission to assess the EMP threat, the recommendations of which stressed the need for
resilient communications to ensure effective recovery/response [2]. In particular, contingency and military
planners are very concerned about shorter timescales in the immediate aftermath of an attack, that is, seconds
to minutes.
Now most large backbones, including military, use fiber-optic systems for ultra-fast transmission over singlemode fiber. In some cases wireless links are also used to reach inaccessible regions or provide backup, that is,
satellite and radio. Overall, the fiber medium is immune to EMP radiation as it does not conduct E1-E3 pulses.
However, fiber-based transmission still relies on many opto-electronic systems that remain vulnerable to EMP
effects, for example, routers, optical cross-connects, multiplexers, remote link regeneration/amplifier units, and
so on. Many of these systems are located at dispersed sites such as central offices (CO), customer premises (CP),
remote amplifier huts, and so on [2]. For the most part, these locations (in commercial settings) provide
minimum shielding against weaker effects, for example, interference, electrostatic discharges, and lightning.
Hence a powerful EMP device will cause rapid and extensive damage to backbone infrastructures. Delayed
cascading power outages are also likely, but their impacts may not be immediate as most networking facilities
have 48–72 hours of backup (batteries, fuel, and generators).
In light of the above, rapid post-attack recovery is a critical concern. However, most networks are only designed
to handle single or dual node and link failures and provide little protection against large EMP attacks (natural
disasters) causing multiple near-instantaneous failures with high spatial and temporal correlation [4], [5]. To
address this concern, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has funded various studies on disaster
recovery, including single domain networks [5], [6], multi-domain networks [7], interdependent pow-ercommunication grids [8], and robust infrastructure design/pre-planning [9]. These contributions leverage
definitions/concepts of pre-fault probabilistic risk regions and have yielded key theoretical findings on failure
modeling and multi-failure recovery. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these solutions in realistic settings
remains to be seen, and this forms the key motivation for this work.
Deploying advanced counter-EMP schemes in real-world communication networks is very challenging due to the
prevalence of vendor-pro-prietary systems and tightly-coupled data-con-trol planes. These dependencies
mandate niche expertise and limit the range of recovery options. However, emerging software defined
networking (SDN) paradigms have redefined legacy boundaries and offer much better service programmability
and agility [10]. Still, SDN only provides a control framework and relegates detailed service provisioning and
recovery algorithm design to operators themselves. Despite some notable testbed studies [11]–[12][13], there
are no known works on SDN-based disaster recovery. Hence, this effort focuses on translating advanced counter-EMP service recovery schemes (only studied in research literature) into real-world settings by developing a
resilient SDN-based management and orchestration (MANO) framework. Namely, these methods incorporate
the definition of pre-fault probabilistic failure regions. A testbed facility is also built to evaluate the solution for
large optical backbones with full conversion and regeneration.

This article is organized as follows. The following section presents a review of recent work in multi-failure
network recovery and SDN testbeds, motivating the need for disaster recovery efforts. We then detail the
resilient SDN MANO architecture, and present findings from the testbed study. Conclusions and future
directions are outlined in the final section.

Existing Work
Various studies have addressed multi-failure network recovery. For example, some have looked at connection
protection for multiple independent failures [4]. However, this approach does not accurately model large
disasters or EMP attacks with high spatio-temporal fault correlation. Hence, [5] introduces a realistic
probabilistic shared risk link group (p-SRLG) model to define a-priori stressor (risk) regions, that is, occurrence
probabilities, conditional link/node failure rates, and so on. New optimization and heuristic methods are then
proposed to minimize primary/backup path failure probabilities for pre-defined stressors. However, since these
schemes focus on risk minimization, they yield longer (less efficient) routes. Hence, [6] outlines a load balancing
heuristic to improve the reliability-efficiency tradeoff. Finally, others have also studied multi-failure recovery in
multi-domain networks, for example, two-stage optimization models to minimize failures at the intradomain/inter-domain levels, adhoc post-fault re-routing, etc [7].
Despite these contributions, few researchers have addressed multi-failure recovery under realworld conditions.
Here, the complex vendor-pro-prietary nature of legacy control setups makes it extremely difficult (if not
impossible) to implement tailored schemes. For example, most setups feature single-vendor network
management systems (NMS) with limited recovery options for single/dual node and link failures [6]. It is here
that emerging SDN frameworks [10] provide a much-needed avenue for building more capable (counter-EMP)
recovery solutions. Namely, SDN decouples the data and control planes and relegates all path computation and
provisioning to controllers operating with “bird's eye” network views. These entities are responsible for
generating flow routes/rules and pushing them onto network nodes, which in turn are streamlined for data
forwarding. This programmable open architecture allows operators to achieve flow-selective routing and can
support a wide range of applications/policies, for example, load balancing, survivability, security, and so on.
Now various SDN protocols have emerged, including OpenFlow, OpenSwitch, OpenLight, NETCONF,
others [10], [13]. Numerous testbeds have also deployed these SDN-based solutions for a range of scenarios, for
example, datacen-ter, enterprise, metro-core, mobile, and so on. Although a detailed survey is out of scope
here, some recent efforts are summarized. For example, [11] extends SDN control for a multi-do-main testbed
running the Floodlight and Open vSwitch protocols. Novel methods are proposed for “east-west” inter-controller
exchange and domain virtualization. Meanwhile, [12] proposes a resilient SDN architecture for connecting highperformance zones in a higher-education network. The authors also use OpenFlow devices to perform failover
switching for isolated link outages. Finally, [13] studies controller failures and compares the scalability and
reliability of multi-controller Open Network Operating System (ONOS) and OpenOaylight (ODL) setups, that is,
for rule installation, network database synchronization, and failover mechanisms. Nevertheless, despite these
(and other) contributions, there are no known SDN studies on large-scale disaster recovery. A detailed
framework is now presented to address this need.

Architecture Design and Development
As noted earlier, several SDN protocols have been developed. However, OpenFlow is chosen here as it is the
most widely-used solution. Several network operating systems have also been proposed to interface with the
southbound (SDN protocol) application programmer interfaces (API) and automate service provisioning, for
example, ONOS(by ON.lab) and the vendor-based ODL solution. Again, ONOS is chosen as it is designed for use
with OpenFlow. Nevertheless, the Open-Flow and ONOS combination still lacks critical features for multi-failure

recovery as it does not provide any path computation element (PCE) for route generation. Therefore, a novel
resilient SDN system MANO framework is developed for disaster recovery support. This setup is specifically
designed to handle large multi-failure (e.g., EMP-type) events and allows operators to pre-specify vulnerable
regions and stressor likelihoods. The framework is shown in Fig. 2 and is comprised of three key entities, that is,
an Abstraction Module, a Resilient Path Computation (RPC) Module, and an ONOS Driver. The solution leverages
the OpenFlow and ONOS frameworks and adds critical features for multi-failure recovery, that is, state visibility,
pre-fault/post-fault schemes, and so on.

Figure 2. Resilient SDN MANO system architecture for multi-failure network recovery.
Overall, the proposed setup assumes that all network nodes are generic bandwidth/circuit provisioning entities,
that is, opaque/full-conversion optical nodes or backbone routers. However, future extensions can be added to
handle all-optical or partial-conversion nodes requiring wavelength continuity. Also, an SDN controller can
represent a single point-of-failure and bottleneck. Hence in practice, multi-controller setups are required to
improve control plane redundancy, and these designs can leverage from related work in [13]. However, this is
left for future study as the focus is on data plane recovery. Consider the details.

Abstraction Module
This module implements a database to allow the resilient SDN-based MANO system to visualize the network, its
risk vulnerabilities, and active flows. This overall state is then used to drive the other key system components,
for example, the ONOS Driver module. In particular, the network markup language (NML) standard [14] is used
to describe the network topology using abstract models based on classes (also called resources), attributes,
relations and parameters. These entities are then encoded in appropriate schema files. For example, NML
defines base schema constructs for physical resources at switches and links using topology-related resources
and properties. These constructs include inbound and outbound link ports and neighbors. Fig. 3 shows a fraction
of the ontology needed to define such a topology.

Figure 3. Extended network markup language (E-NML) schema.
Nevertheless, the base NML schema [14] only details static topologies. Hence, new class and attribute
definitions are also introduced for critical risk vulnerability and path route information to support multi-failure
disaster recovery, called extended NML (E-NML) (see Fig. 3). Foremost, a shared risk resource group (SRRG)
service class is defined to group nodes and links with common a-priori risks. Here a SRRG resource identifies a
group of nodes and ports with specific severity and failure probability values, respectively, given by

the severity and occurenceProbability properties. Note that the shared risk (link) group concept has been studied
by researchers [5]–[6][7], but its adaptation in operational SDN settings for multi-failure recovery is lacking.
Next, a path service model is introduced to enhance the NML base schema and define control plane flow rules
to detail logical relations. Namely, the nodes, ports and flow rules associated with a source-destination pair are
specified by a new flow service class, called openFlowService (see Fig. 3). This class defines several other flowrelated classes, relations, attributes and parameters. Foremost, openFlow-Service resources are associated with
a topology, which in turn supports SDN nodes with flow tables, that is, providesFlowTable property. A flow table
is also defined by the flowTable class and provides a set of flows (Flow resources) through
the providesFlow relation property. Ideally, a flow class is created to match a flow, and hence
the flowMatch relation defines a flowRule traffic criteria, that is, source/des-tination media access control (MAC)
addresses, source/destination IP addresses, inbound/ outbound ports, virtual LAN (VLAN) identifiers, and so on.
Furthermore, a flowRule is also associated with a flow by a flowAction relation to determine control plane
decision-making for specific traffic data, that is, forward frame through outbound port N. Finally, a set of
NML flow objects (instantiated flow classes) are also defined for each source-destination path pair, and each
path is also assigned a unique identification number (UUID).
The Resilient Path Computation Module retrieves state information from the Abstraction Module and performs
constrained route computation between requesting source-destination nodes. Topology information is used to
build a graph-based network view comprised of vertices and edges.

Resilient Path Computation (RPC) Module
This module retrieves state information from the Abstraction Module and performs constrained route
computation between requesting source-destination nodes. Topology information is used to build a graph-based
network view comprised of vertices and edges. Meanwhile, input requests are defined via a new path request
service model which specifies a source, destination, and desired bandwidth capacity (see Fig. 3). Now as noted
above, several polynomial-time graph-based algorithms have been developed for multi-failure disaster
recovery [5]–[6][7]. Hence, some of these (and some other baseline) solutions are adapted here (Fig. 4).

Figure 4. Network service recovery mechanisms (pre- and post-fault).

No Protection (NP)
This baseline scheme does not provide any backup. A primary path is provisioned for a request using Dijkstra's
shortest path algorithm based upon a desired network traffic engineering (TE) objective, for example, hop count
minimization, load balancing, and so on.

Standard Protection (SP)
This scheme computes a backup path, that is, a primary-backup path pair (Fig. 4). The algorithm starts by
computing the k shortest-paths between the source and destination. Node-disjoint protection paths are then
derived for each candidate path, and the path pair with the lowest combined TE cost is chosen based on hop
count or load cost. This joint computation strategy is more efficient than a greedy sequential approach (which
first computes a primary path, prunes related links/nodes, and then computes a backup route).

Risk Minimization (RM)
This scheme computes a primary working path in a “risk-averse” manner to increase reliability based upon prespecified risk regions defined by operators, that is, occurrence probabilities and conditional node/link failure
rates (p-SRLG models in the Abstraction Module). A constrained path is computed to minimize risks over a
modified topology with link weights set as logarithmic functions of the risk probabilities [5], [6]. Expectedly, path
reliability will depend upon the accuracy of the a-priori SRLG models.

Joint Risk Minimization (JRM)
This scheme extends the RM scheme to compute a “risk-averse” backup path. Namely, the k shortest-paths are
computed over a modified graph using the same logarithmic link weights. Node-disjoint backup paths are then
computed for each possible primary path, and the working-backup path pair with the minimum TE cost (using
hop count or load balancing) is chosen (see [6]). Hence, this scheme tries to achieve a balance between cost and
risk, but for small k values (k≤3) will still favor the latter.

Post-Fault Restoration (PFR)
This method focuses on post-fault recovery and can be used in conjunction with any of the above schemes. The
RPC module waits for a pre-defined hold-off time to allow the Abstraction Module to collect updated topological
and path service state. New routes are then re-computed for affected paths experiencing one/more link failures
to re-estab-lish connectivity. The affected paths are randomly selected for recovery, and path re-computation is
done using the baseline NP scheme.
After computation, the path is translated/ stored in a path service model in the Abstraction Module database
(see Fig. 2). Note that the unprotected NP and JRM schemes only store one main path, whereas the protected
SP and JRM schemes store anadditional backup path (albeit only one is active, as detailed next).

ONOS Driver
ONOS provides a framework for managing Open-Flow-capable devices. Leveraging this, the ONOS Driver module
in Fig. 2 implements the main interface with the underlying ONOS controller via the ONOS REST representational
state transfer (REST) API. Several key directional transfers are implemented. Foremost, topology state is pulled
in the northbound direction from SDN-enabled devices, that is, to populate the Abstraction Module database
when prompted by an incoming request. Meanwhile, path route information is pushed in
the southbound direction to instantiate end-to-end routes. Namely, the ONOS Driver retrieves the relevant path
request service model from the Abstraction Module to obtain the flow rules, that is, frame
processing/forwarding. This model is then parsed and encoded into JavaScript object notation (JSON) format
and sent to the ONOS controller to distribute to all path nodes. The OpenFlow flow identification numbers (FID)
assigned to each deployed flow are also retrieved and passed to the Abstraction Module database to track the
deployed flow rules, that is, northbound transfer.
Now only one path service model can be active at a given time for a demand. Hence, primary path rule sets are
established after a request is processed. However, for protected demands (SP, JRM schemes), backup path
switchover/ reversion is only performed after link/node failures are detected. Here the ONOS Driver module

retrieves all currently-active primary FID routes from the Abstraction Module database and signals the ONOS
controller to remove affected flows with failed link(s). Flow rules for all corresponding backup paths (unaffected
by failures) are then pushed to the SDN controller to re-establish routes. Now if path protection is not
provisioned (NP, SP, or RM schemes) and/or backup protection paths are also affected by failures, then the PFR
scheme can (optionally) be used to recover failed routes. Here the ONOS Driver removes the SDN flow table
entries for affected paths by invoking a procedure to retrieve failure-affected paths. For each such path, the PFR
algorithm searches for a recovery path and allocates bandwidth on its links before performing switchover. Akin
to the pre-computation schemes, this approach relies on a service request model with a source and destination
pair. Once the shortest path is computed, a service model is defined and stored in the database.
Note that larger multi-area networks will require multiple (SDN) controllers, mandating distributed inter-domain
path computation. Specifically, multiple ONOS Driver instances will have to be instantiated to communicate
(push, pull) required topology information between peer SDN controllers. However, inter-domain path
computation is complicated by the lack of global visibility, and many different schemes have been proposed.
Note that larger multi-area networks will require multiple (SDN) controllers, mandating distributed interdomain path computation. Specifically, multiple ONOS Driver modules will have to be instantiated to
communicate (push, pull) required topology information between peer SDN controllers. However, inter-domain
path computation is complicated by the lack of global visibility, and many different schemes have been
proposed (see [7], [13]). Owing to these complexities, such features are left for future study.

Testbed Study
The resilient SDN-based MANO framework is implemented in an advanced testbed and evaluated for a range of
nuclear EMP threats. The impact of such attacks is best gauged for a large conti-nental-sized backbone, and
hence the testbed uses a realistic 75 node/99 link Continental US (CONUS) topology from the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (DARPA) CORONET project [15]. This network is implemented using a combination of
real-world physical and soft-ware-emulated network nodes and links. Specifically, five OpenFlow-enabled
iwNetworks Pronto 3290 bare-metal switches are used to build part of the CONUS network at the University of
Maryland Mid-Atlantic Crossroads (MAX) facility. The remaining nodes and links are emulated in Mininet on a
quad-core Intel Xeon E3-1200 processor with 8 gigabytes of memory. All key system modules (Fig. 3) are
separately implemented in a quad-core Intel Xeon E3-1200 processor with 32 gigabytes of memory.
A range of potential EMP attacks are developed for the central United States. This region is of key strategic
interest (vulnerability) since its nodes/links serve in critical transit roles for cross-country routes. Note that
several stressors are also tested over the East and West Coast regions, but these give low recovery rates since a
large percentage of the failed nodes are source/ destination end-points, that is, they need physical repair. Now
as detailed in [1], low-altitude EMP attacks (HoB in 50–300 miles) exhibit “smi-ley face” geometries (due to
Earth's magnetic fields) with three failure sub-regions (see Fig. 5a). The (red) sub-region closest to the epicenter
experiences near complete failure of unshielded nodes and links. The wider surrounding (yel-low) sub-region
also sees relatively high failures, that is, 75 percent range. However, the outer (green) sub-region has notably
lower outages, averaging 20 percent. Based on this, three EMP attack types are defined, as shown superimposed
over the CORONET test network in Fig. 5. These stressors include a 50 mile HoB with 700 mile diameter (Stressor
1, Fig. 5a), an 80 mile HoB with 1,120 mile diameter (Stressor 2, Fig. 5b), and a 100 mile HoB with 1,440 mile
diameter (Stressor 3, Fig. 5b). The smaller Stressor 1 tests are further evaluated for five epicenters to gauge
geographic sensitivity, that is, Central (C), West Central (WC), East Central (EC), South Central (SC), and North
Central (NC) (see Fig. 5a). Also, three random permutations are averaged for each stressor site to evaluate
different node/ link failure combinations in the yellow and green regions. Meanwhile, the larger Stressor 2 and 3
scenarios are only tested for one epicenter as they span most of the central United States, that is, almost cause

network partitioning. Still, three random permutations are tested. Note that these test cases include link failures
between surviving/working end-points, that is, to model optical amolifier/link failures.

Figure 5. Nuclear EMP stressor footprints over 75-node CONUS topology: a) Stressor 1 (50 mile HoB); b)
Stressors 2, 3 (80, 100 mile).
The scenarios are evaluated for medium-to-heavy load with 100 cross-country connections between random
East and West Coast locations (requesting 5 percent link capacity). In general, these test cases
represent an optical backbone carrying wavelength lightpaths with full/ adequate conversion and regeneration.
Now the actual “attacks” are triggered by running scripts to fail the impacted nodes/links specified inthe test
cases. As noted earlier, the “risk-aware” (RM, JRM) schemes require a-priori SRRG regions for path computation
and hence three types are defined/inputted, that is, East Coast, Central, and West Coast. As the Central region is
most relevant here, its SRRG footprint is purposely set different from any of the test cases (Stressors 1–3 in Fig.
5). This choice injects a high degree of realism as actual and predicted failures will rarely match. A subset of tests
are also done using a minimum level of EMP hardening. Twenty percent of nodes and links (opto-electronic
regeneration units) in the central region of the CONUS network are assumed to be immune to E1 and E2 effects,
for example, via MIL 188–125 or TEMPEST shielding.
Overall post-attack failure rates are shown in Fig. 6, that is, the number of failed connections after recovery
attempts. A tiered recovery strategy is also implemented where the postfault re-routing (PFR) scheme is done in
case of backup route failure. Foremost, the results for Stressor 1 attacks in Fig. 6a indicate very high outages for
regular unprotected demands, that is, over 70 percent of failures for the NP scheme in non-hardened networks.
Sensitivity to epicenter location is also evident here, with attacks in the SC and WC regions failing over 90
percent of unprotected East-West connection paths. However, these findings also confirm notable improvement
with the survivability schemes. For example, the basic node-disjoint protection (SP scheme) gives 10–30 percent
fewer failures depending upon Stressor 1 epicenters, and these gains increase with higher initial failures. More
importantly, the “risk-aware” schemes give even better results. For example, using a-priori information to
compute more resilient routes (RM scheme) yields 20 percent fewer failures versus regular TE routing (NP
scheme) for attacks in the WC region and over 50 percent in the SC region. “Risk-aware” route protection (JRM
scheme) is even more effective, with post-fault failures dropping to under 30 percent in most cases. The
improvement over basic protection (SP scheme) is also quite significant, with 20 to 40 percent fewer route
failures. Finally, active post-fault re-routing (PFR scheme) recovers all failed demands regardless, as Stressor 1
footprints leave sufficient post-fault working link capacity.

Figure 6. Post-attack connection failure rates: a) Stressor 1, b) Stressor 2, c) Stressor 3.
However, results for larger EMP attacks show much higher outages, that is, Fig. 6b(Stressor 2) and Fig.
6c (Stressor 3). For example, unprotected TE-routed demands experience near total failure in all cases.
Furthermore, basic protection (SP scheme) only gives nominal recovery, under 10 percent. More importantly, apriori risk information (RM, JRM schemes) provides minimal failure reduction for both stressors, that is, since
larger failure regions dwarf the smaller a-pri-ori central failure region. In other words, the realistic discrepancy
between predicted and actual failure footprints reduces the effectiveness of a-priori methods. By contrast,
theoretical studies show notably better recovery since they assume ideal matching failure regions [4], [5].
Nevertheless, post-fault re-routing (PFR scheme) is still very effective for larger attacks, that is, recovering all
Stressor 2 outages (Fig. 6b) and lowering Stressor 3 failures to below 50 percent (Fig. 6c). However this scheme
still cannot provide full recovery in the latter case since only one or two working links are left to prevent
network partitioning (bandwidth congestion when re-routing large numbers of affected demands).
As noted earlier, the “risk-aware” methods (RM, JRM, and PFR schemes) are also evaluated for moderate levels
of network EMP hardening (the shaded bars in Fig. 6). These results indicate that the “risk-aware” RM and JRM
schemes generally give moderate (non-negligible) recovery gains in hardened networks for smaller Stressor 1
and 2 type attacks, in the 0–20 percent range (Figs. 6a and 6b). However, failure reduction with network
hardening is much more pronounced for larger Stressor 3 events, that is, in the 40 to 50 percent range (Fig. 6c).
Furthermore, post-fault re-routing (PFR scheme) even recovers all failed routes for larger Stressor 3 attacks, that
is, since hardened networks generally provide more capacity on critical transit links. These findings indicate that
operators can reduce, that is, tradeoff, their investments innetwork hardening to an extent by deploying more
capable SDN-based recovery solutions.
Average route length (hop count) is also measured to gauge resource utilization (see Table 1). These results
confirm notably longer pre-fault routes with backup protection, about 40 percent. However, “risk-aware”
routing only gives a slight increase in usage versus regular TE provisioning, that is, 1 to 2 percent higher average
hop counts with the RM scheme (JRM scheme) versus the TE scheme (SP scheme). Meanwhile, post-fault PFR
recovery shows sensitivity to stressor size and location. For example, the larger Stressor 2 and 3 attacks yield
longer routes, averaging 13 to 14 hops (non-hardened). At the same time, some smaller Stressor 1 epicen-ters
also give higher utilization, on par with larger attacks. These findings also show a slight decrease in post-fault
utilization with network hardening, that is, less detoured routes.

A-priori risk information (RM, JRM schemes) provides minimal failure reduction for both stressors, that is, since
larger failure regions dwarf the smaller a-priori central failure region. In other words, the realistic discrepancy
between predicted and actual failure footprints reduces the effectiveness of a-priori methods. By contrast,
theoretical studies show notably better recovery since they assume ideal matching failure regions.
Finally, in terms of delay, it takes about 2 minutes (1.25 minutes) to compute a primary (protection) path.
However, since all routes are pre-computed and stored beforehand, post-at-tack recovery is not impacted.
Meanwhile, average connection setup times are about 2 minutes during working conditions. Conversely,
average post-fault recovery delays with the PFR scheme are generally higher, as shown in Table 1, including
cumulative switchover times from failed protection paths to re-computed working
routes (SP→PFR or JRM→PFR). These findings confirm that “risk-aware” provisioning gives faster recovery as
there are fewer failed routes to recover, as seen by comparing SP→PFR with IRM→PFR times (non-hardened).
Moreover, hardening gives equivalent or lower averages as it yields fewer failures.
This study presents a novel resilient SDN control framework for disaster recovery, with a focus on large spacebased nuclear EMP attacks. The solution introduces new survivability-related schema
definitions and implements a range of pre-fault and post-fault strategies.
Table 1. Average path lengths (hops) and post-fault switchover times
Pre-fault path lengths (hops)
Scheme TE
Stressor 1–3 11.46
Post-fault path lengths (hops)
NonScheme 
Stressor 1

RM
11.73

C
NC
SC
EC
WC

Stressor 2
Stressor 3
Post-fault switchover time (s)
NonScheme 
Stressor 1

Stressor 2
Stressor 3

C
NC
SC
EC
WC

SP
15.76

JRM
15.9

JRM  PFR
11.87
12.42
11.27
12.40
12.01
13.88
14.38

Hardened
JRM  PFR
11.48
12.44
11.00
11.40
11.59
12.27
13.00

ardened
SP  PFR
8.5

JRM  PFR
3.3

Hardened
JRM  PFR
2.6

9.2
5.9
8.9
10.4
14.7
15.0

4.7
2.7
3.3
3.3
13.7
15.0

4.7
2.7
2.6
3.3
13.4
9.0

ardened
SP  PFR
10.98
11.71
10.93
11.10
11.25
12.04
13.35

Conclusions and Future Efforts
This study presents a novel resilient SDN control framework for disaster recovery, with a focus on large spacebased nuclear EMP attacks. The solution introduces new survivability-related schema definitions and
implements a range of pre-fault and post-fault strategies. The framework is deployed in an advanced SDN
testbed running the ONOS framework to manage OpenFlow switches. Various scenarios are evaluated, and the
findings validate results from earlier theoretical studies on the benefit of using a-priori risk information and fast
re-routing recovery. More importantly, this effort demonstrates the effectiveness of using SDN protocols to
implement counter-EMP network recovery. As such, this testbed provides a vital operational facility to develop
and evaluate further pre-fault/ post-fault EMP mitigation schemes. These efforts caninclude modified path
recovery schemes, delayed cascading failure methods, expanded multi-domain disaster recovery methods, static
network pre-design (EMP hardening), and post-fault repair strategies. The latter efforts can include rapid
deployment of backup cellular and/or satellite communication assets to re-establish connectivity.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work has been funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) under Grant HDTRA1-13-C-0027.
The authors are very grateful for this support.

References
1. S. Gladstone, P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, United States Department of Defense and the Energy
Research and Development Administration, 1977.
2. S. Gladstone, P. Dolan, "Critical National Infrastructures" in Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to
the US from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, April 2008.
3. M. Naeini et al., "Modeling Stochastic Correlated Failures and Their Effects on Network Reliability", Proc. IEEE
ICCCN 2011, Aug. 2011.
4. Q. She, X. Huang, J. Jue, "Maximum Survivability Under Multiple Failures", IEEE/OSA Optical Fiber Conf. (OFC)
2006, Mar. 2006.
5. H. Lee, E. Modiano, K. Lee, "Diverse Routing in Networks with Probabilistic Failures", IEEE/ACM Trans.
Networking, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 1895-1907, Dec. 2010.
6. O. Diaz et al., "Network Survivability for Multiple Probabilistic Failures", IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 16, no. 8, pp.
1320-23, 2012.
7. N. Ghani, M. Peng, A. Rayes, N. Anto-niades, G. Ellinas, I. Roudas, "Service Provisioning and Survivability in
Multi-Domain Optical Networks" in Design and Engineering of WDM Systems and Networks, Springer,
pp. 481-519, 2011.
8. S. Buldyrev et al., "Catastrophic Cascade of Failures in Interdependent Networks", Nature, vol. 464, pp. 102528, Apr. 2010.
9. P. Agarwal et al., "The Resilience of WDM Networks to Probabilistic Geographical Failures", IEEE/ACM Trans.
Networking, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 1525-38, Oct. 2013.
10. B. Nunes et al., "A Survey of Software-Defined Networking: Past Present and Future of Programmable
Networks" in IEEE Commun. Surveys & Tutorials, pp. 1617-34, 3rd Quarter, Feb. 2014.
11. P. Lin et al., "A West-East Bridge Based SDN Inter-Domain Testbed", IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 2, pp.
190-97, Feb. 2015.
12. M. Menth et al., "Resilient Integration of Distributed High-Performance Zones into the BelWue Network
Using OpenFlow", IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 94-99, Apr. 2017.
13. D. Suh et al., "Toward Highly Available and Scalable Software Defined Networks for Service Providers", IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 100-07, Apr. 2017.
14. J. Ham et al., "Network Markup Language Base Schema Version 1" in Open Grid Forum, 2013.
15. G. Clapp et al., "Management of Switched Systems at 100 Tbps: The DARPA CORONET Program", Proc. Intl
Conf. Photonics in Switching 2009 (PS 2009), Sept. 2009.

